Using Tuangou to reduce IP transit costs by Castro Arribas, Ignacio et al.
CIPT: Using Tuangou to Reduce IP Transit Costs∗
Rade Stanojevic† Ignacio Castro Sergey Gorinsky
Institute IMDEA Networks, Madrid, Spain
ABSTRACT
A majority of ISPs (Internet Service Providers) support con-
nectivity to the entire Internet by transiting their traffic via
other providers. Although the transit prices per Mbps de-
cline steadily, the overall transit costs of these ISPs remain
high or even increase, due to the traffic growth. The discon-
tent of the ISPs with the high transit costs has yielded notable
innovations such as peering, content distribution networks,
multicast, and peer-to-peer localization. While the above
solutions tackle the problem by reducing the transit traffic,
this paper explores a novel approach that reduces the tran-
sit costs without altering the traffic. In the proposed CIPT
(Cooperative IP Transit), multiple ISPs cooperate to jointly
purchase IP (Internet Protocol) transit in bulk. The aggregate
transit costs decrease due to the economies-of-scale effect of
typical subadditive pricing as well as burstable billing: not
all ISPs transit their peak traffic during the same period. To
distribute the aggregate savings among the CIPT partners,
we propose Shapley-value sharing of the CIPT transit costs.
Using public data about IP traffic of 264 ISPs and transit
prices, we quantitatively evaluate CIPT and show that signif-
icant savings can be achieved, both in relative and absolute
terms. We also discuss the organizational embodiment, re-
lationship with transit providers, traffic confidentiality, and
other aspects of CIPT.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.3 [Computer-communications networks]: Net-
work operations; network management
∗Tuangou (pronounced ”twangoo”), a term originating in
China, loosely translates as team buying or group buying,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tuangou.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet ecosystem involves thousands of ISPs
(Internet Service Providers) linked in a more or less hi-
erarchical manner to support universal connectivity of
Internet users. Only a handful of huge ISPs can ac-
cess the entire Internet without paying anyone for the
reachability. For the vast majority of the other ISPs,
the universal connectivity comes at the price of IP (In-
ternet Protocol) transit: typically, a smaller ISP pays
a larger provider for the traffic transited in both di-
rections of the link between the two ISPs. Although
the transit prices per Mbps decline steadily [21], the in-
terdomain traffic grows [27], and the overall IP transit
costs remain high or even increase according to industry
analysts [6, 20, 26].
The problem of reducing the IP transit costs has at-
tracted notable solutions of IXPs (Internet eXchange
Points) [4, 14], IP multicast [13], CDNs (Content Dis-
tribution Networks) [38], P2P (Peer-to-Peer) localiza-
tion [10], and traffic smoothing [28, 34]. One property
that these proposals share is their objective to reduce
the amount of traffic that traverses transit links. In-
tuitively, the less traffic of an ISP flows through those
links, the lower the cost is for the ISP.
This paper proposes CIPT (Cooperative IP Transit),
a different approach to reducing the cost of IP tran-
sit. Instead of altering the traffic that flows through
the transit links, CIPT reduces the price of transit per
Mbps: by jointly purchasing the IP transit, two or more
ISPs reduce the transit prices per Mbps for each ISP
involved in the CIPT.
While CIPT is a novel proposal in the context of the
Internet ecosystem, group buying (tuangou) has been
highly successful in other domains [29]. Similarly to
the tuangou elsewhere, CIPT succeeds primarily due
to subadditivity of prices [21, 44, 45]. However, the
benefits of CIPT depend also on burstable billing [16],
different methods to account for bidirectional traffic,
and other complex factors.
Relying on real inter-domain traffic and transit pric-
ing, we empirically estimate the potential gains from
CIPT and tradeoffs between several factors that affect
these gains. We also propose to use Shapley value [46] as
a basis for sharing the gains among the CIPT partners
so that to provide each partner with a strong economic
incentive for the cooperation. Our evaluation of the ag-
gregate and individual gains involves collection of the
visual (mrtg [7]) traffic statistics available from 6 public
IXPs with 264 participating ISPs, transformation of the
visual images into a numeric format, and public-data
validation of the property that peering and transit traf-
fic have similar temporal profiles. Our analysis suggests
that the expected relative savings of CIPT are in the
range of 8-56% for the IXP-wide coalitions; in absolute
terms, each of the partners may expect annualized sav-
ings from one thousand US$ for very small ISPs to sev-
eral hundred thousand US$ for the few large (national)
ISPs. We also show that much smaller coalitions, with
a half a dozen of members, can offer close-to-maximum
savings. The main contributions of our paper can be
summarized as follows:
• We propose CIPT, a simple strategy to reduce
costs by purchasing IP transit jointly.
• We show that CIPT can be modeled as a coop-
erative game and that Shapley value provides an
intuitive mechanism for cost sharing in CIPT.
• We use public IXP data to infer the traffic time
series for several hundred (mostly regional and na-
tional) ISPs and use this information to assess the
potential benefits of CIPT.
The two critical properties that enable CIPT, namely
the subadditive pricing and 95-th percentile billing, are
ubiquitous in the IP transit market and have existed
from early days of the commercial Internet. The ques-
tion of how long the IP pricing retains these proper-
ties remains open. In the entertainment industry (cin-
ema, sports, etc.) that have offered group discounts
for decades, group-discounted tickets still constitute a
minor fraction of the revenues. Although IP transit is
different from the entertainment industry in many ways,
we believe in a similar outcome for CIPT: CIPT coali-
tions will not dominate the IP transit market nor change
the transit pricing structure. However, if CIPT coali-
tions become very common or large, their emergence
can lead to a modified pricing structure and other new
strategic behaviors in the Internet. An in-depth anal-
ysis of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this
paper.
Committed Data Rate (Mbps) Price per Mbps per month
10 $25
50 $15
100 $10
1000 $5
10000 $4
Table 1: IP transit pricing rates of Voxel.net.
While our results on the CIPT cost reduction validate
the potential of CIPT to be become a new element of the
Internet ecosystem, the practical viability of CIPT also
depends on other strategic and organizational issues.
These issues are discussed in Section 6 and, in more
depth, in the technical report [43].
2. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
The geographic location affects significantly the cost
of IP transit. The IP transit prices per Mbps per month
range usually from $5 to $100 (we use $, US$ or USD to
refer to U.S. dollars throughout the paper): the whole-
sale IP transit is typically priced under $10 per Mbps
in most European and North American hubs but can
exceed $100 per Mbps in Australia, Latin America and
other remote regions of the Internet [2, 21].
Regardless of the geographic location, IP transit is
subject to economies of scale and is priced subaddi-
tively: the prices per Mbps per month1 are smaller
for larger quantities of IP transit [21, 45, 44]. Table 1
presents the current (as of June 2011) transit pricing
rates of Voxel dot net [45]. The table reports the prices
for different levels of CDR (Committed Data Rate), the
minimum amount charged by the provider. For exam-
ple, an ISP with IP transit needs of 300 Mbps commits
at the 100-Mbps CDR level and pays pro rata $3000
to Voxel but an ISP with IP transit needs of 700 Mbps
finds it more cost-effective to commit at the 1000-Mbps
CDR level and pay $5000.
Burstable billing is another important aspect of IP
transit pricing [16, 34]. To calculate the IP transit cost,
the most commonly used method is to calculate the
peak usage (typically through the 95th-percentile rule
[16, 34]) and then the price function f is applied to
the observed peak to calculate the resulting payment.
The peak value is usually calculated separately for the
upstream and downstream directions, and either sum
or maximum of the two is used for billing. We refer
to these two pricing models as sum and max models.
Intuitively, the max model offers a larger opportunity
for savings in CIPT because two ISPs with their traffic
peaks in opposite directions can mutually benefit from
the less utilized direction of each other.
Finally, it is important noting that the prices (per
1Throughout the paper we use the cost unit $ per Mbps,
omitting the charging period: one month.
Figure 1: Demand statistics for partners P1
(top), P2 (middle), and P3 (bottom) in the moti-
vating example: the x-axes are in hours; the y-
axes are in Mbps; the filled (green) areas depict
the upstream traffic; the (blue) lines represent
the downstream traffic.
Mbps) of transit are in constant decline over the previ-
ous decade, with an average decay of around 25− 30%
per year [21]. Even though market forces inevitably
drive this trend, the total amount of interdomain traf-
fic grows with a rate that outpaces the decay in prices.
The recent paper from Arbor Networks [27] reports an
annualized inter-domain traffic growth (on a set of 110
geo-diverse ISPs) of 44.5%. CISCO [11] and MINTS
[35] report slightly higher annual growth figures, in the
range of 50− 60%. While a fair fraction of this growth
is due to increased peering [4], there is still a consen-
sus that most of the access/content providers do not
see the reduction in their transit bill. To quote Erik
Kreifeldt, a senior analyst for TeleGeography: “... the
growth offsets the price decline, so revenue (of transit
providers) is more or less consistent or growing” [26].
Similar observations have been made by several other
business analysts [6, 20].
To illustrate the potential of CIPT, we consider a
simple scenario of three partners2 P1, P2, and P3 inter-
ested in purchasing IP transit from the same provider.
We assume the transit pricing rates as in Table 1, 95th-
percentile burstable billing, sum model of accounting
for bidirectional traffic, and traffic profiles plotted in
Figure 1.
If the three partners purchase the IP transit sepa-
rately, the individual traffic peaks (computed as the
2We interchangeably use terms partner, subject and player
to refer to an ISP, hosting provider, website or any other
entity interested in purchasing IP transit.
sum of the peaks in both directions) of P1, P2, and P3
are at 379 Mbps, 130 Mbps, and 362 Mbps respectively,
and each of the partners commits at the 100-Mbps CDR
level. Thus, partners P1, P2, and P3 pay respectively
$3790, $1300, and $3620 with the aggregate transit cost
of $8710 (per month).
On the other hand, if P1, P2 and P3 use CIPT to buy
the IP transit together, their aggregate peak traffic is
712Mbps. By committing at the 1000-Mbps CDR level,
the CIPT pays $5000. Thus, the cooperation reduces
the aggregate transit cost of the partners by $3710, or
43%. This significant cost reduction comes from two
different sources:
1. Burstable billing – the 712-Mbps peak of the ag-
gregate traffic is lower than the 871-Mbps sum of
the individual traffic peaks; hence, the aggregate
transit cost would decrease even if the pricing func-
tion were additive;
2. Subadditive pricing – the upgrade from the 100-
Mbps CDR level to the 1000-Mbps one yields a
lower price per Mbps and thereby reduces the ag-
gregate transit cost even further.
3. COOPERATIVE IP TRANSIT
In the previous sections we hinted at the main idea
of the CIPT. This section provides more details and
discusses several aspects of the strategy.
We use the term Cooperative IP Transit (CIPT) to
refer to any cooperative scheme in which two or more
subjects purchase the IP transit jointly as a means for
cost reduction. The subject interested in CIPT can be
any Internet entity that buys IP transit; such entities
include websites and hosting providers, as well as access,
nonprofit, and content ISPs.
The main incentive for forming a CIPT coalition is
financial: each partner reduces its individual IP transit
bill. The typical IP transit pricing makes it virtually im-
possible for a set of potential partners to increase their
aggregate transit cost by buying the IP transit jointly.
However, CIPT needs a reasonable mechanism to dis-
tribute the aggregate cost savings among all the CIPT
partners. Furthermore, the aggregate and individual
IP transit costs of the CIPT partners strongly depend
on a number of factors such as the IP transit pricing
function, number of partners, their size, and temporal
patterns of their traffic demands.
Formally, CIPT is a set of N partners. Each partner i
of the CIPT has upstream and downstream IP transit
traffic demands represented respectively by time series
ui(t) and di(t) where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, and time t is
measured in fixed-size time intervals with a typical in-
terval duration of 5 minutes. The cost that subject i
pays for the transit (without participation in CIPT) is
the function of these demand series:
Ci = F (ui(·), di(·)).
After bundling of N subjects, the aggregate upstream/
downstream demands are the sum of the corresponding
individual demands:
u(t) =
N∑
i=1
ui(t) and d(t) =
N∑
i=1
di(t),
and the aggregate cost of the IP transit is
C = F (u(·), d(·)).
The 95th-percentiles of the upstream (peak(up)) and
downstream (peak(down)) traffic are calculated, and the
peak value used for billing is either the sum or max of
these two values, depending on which of these two mod-
els (described in Section 2) is used. The transit cost of
the coalition of these N players is then
C = F (u(·), d(·)) = f(peak)
where f is the pricing function decided by the IP transit
provider. This pricing function is typically subadditive;
see Section 2 for an example of such pricing function. As
we will see, virtually always the overall IP transit cost
of CIPT is strictly smaller than the sum of individual
IP transit costs of all involved players (see later sections
for empirical validation of the fact):
ρ =
C∑N
i=1 Ci
< 1.
The relative savings (1− ρ) of the CIPT are influenced
by several factors, with the two dominant being: (1) the
subadditivity of the price function and (2) burstable
billing through the 95th-percentile method. Namely,
the subadditive pricing allows obtaining lower prices
(per Mbps) when buying at larger quantities, which in
turn results in savings for the involved players. Addi-
tionally, with the burstable billing, when two or more
players have non-overlapping peak hours, their coali-
tion would have the peak value strictly smaller than the
sum of the peak values of the involved players. While
players that serve similar user bases have similar tem-
poral usage patterns (e.g. residential networks peak in
evening hours, government/academic networks peak in
early afternoon), the networks of different types expe-
rience their peaks in times that are far apart, which in
turns allows for additional savings on top of bundling
and buying-in-bulk.
3.1 CIPT as a cooperative game
In this section, we briefly describe the concept of co-
operative (or coalitional) games and show that CIPT
can be seen as a cooperative game.
A cooperative game is characterized by set N of in-
volved players and a cost function that maps the par-
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Figure 2: The distribution of ratios of the 95th-
percentile of the union to the sum of the 95th-
percentiles across all the pairs of ISPs from the
Slovak IXP.
titive3 set of N to a cost value: c : 2N → R. In the
context of CIPT, set N is the set of subjects interested
in purchasing IP transit. The cost function maps an ar-
bitrary subset S ⊂ N to the cost of the IP transit that
the coalition of players from S would pay. An impor-
tant property of the IP transit model is that the price
per Mbps is a non-increasing function of the peak, due
to the subadditive nature of the pricing model.
Additionally, for virtually any real-world subjects in-
terested in purchasing IP transit, the peak traffic of the
union of two subjects is smaller than the sum of the
peaks of these two subjects. In case of measuring the
peak as the maximal traffic, this is an obvious conse-
quence of the fact that the maximum of the sum of two
nonnegative functions (over the same domain) is not
greater than the sum of the maximums of these two
functions. If the peak is measured through the 95th-
percentile method, there may be some irregular cases
in which the sum of the 95th-percentiles is smaller than
the 95th-percentile of the union of the traffic of the two
subjects4. However, these situations are extremely un-
likely to happen in regular setups as we demonstrate in
Figure 2. There we plot the ratio of the 95th-percentile
of the union to the sum of the 95th-percentiles across
all the pairs of ISPs from the Slovak Internet Exchange
(SIX). The SIX and several other IXPs publish statis-
tics for the traffic exchanged by each of their members
(mostly regional ISPs). This information represents a
valuable proxy for estimating the traffic patterns (vol-
ume, peak-hour, peak-to-valley ratio, up/downstream
3For set N , the partitive set of N is the set of all subsets of
N and is usually denoted as 2N .
4For example, two subjects consuming 100 Mbps 4% of the
time each, one in the morning and the other overnight, and
using 1 Mbps the remaining 96% of the time will have their
95th-percentile equal to 1 Mbps, while their union would
have 95th-percentile equal to 100 Mbps.
traffic ratio, etc.) for the involved ISPs; see Section
5.1.2 and Appendix for more details.
Observation 1. The traffic patterns of potential CIPT
members are such that for (almost) all pairs of coalitions
S1 and S2 of these subjects, the peak value of the union
of the two coalitions is smaller than the sum of the peak
values of these two coalitions.
As we elaborate above, Observation 1 is very intuitive
and can be empirically validated for available data of
traffic patterns. From now on, we assume that subjects
involved in CIPT are such that this observation is true.
In that case, cost function c(·) is indeed subadditive:
c(S1) + c(S2) ≥ c(S1 ∪ S2), for any S1, S2 ⊂ N . (1)
4. COST SHARING IN CIPT
A key question in any cooperation scheme created for
cost reduction reasons is how to split the aggregate cost
of cooperation. As we saw in Section 3.1 the CIPT can
be abstracted as a cooperative game which allows us to
use the rich set of analytic tools for solving the problem
of cost sharing. There are many solution concepts for
cost sharing in cooperative games, including the core,
kernel, nucleolus, and Shapley value [46]. While other
solution concepts have attractive features, in the con-
text of CIPT we find particularly appealing to use Shap-
ley value since it has several distinct important proper-
ties, i.e., Shapley value: (1) exists for any cooperative
game and is uniquely determined, (2) satisfies basic fair-
ness postulates [40, 46], and (3) is individually rational,
i.e., each player in CIPT receives a lower Shapley value
cost than what it would be if it did not participate in
CIPT. One potential deficiency of the Shapley value is
that in general it is computationally hard to compute
it exactly. However, state-of-the-art techniques provide
simple and accurate methods for Shapley value approx-
imation, as discussed in Section 4.2.
4.1 Shapley value: definition
For a cooperative game defined over set N of N play-
ers and each subset (coalition) S ⊂ N , let c(S) be the
cost of coalition S. Thus, if coalition S of players agrees
to cooperate, then c(S) determines the total cost for this
coalition.
For a given cooperative game (N , c(·)), the Shapley
value is a (unique) vector (φ1(c), . . . , φN (c)) defined be-
low, for sharing the cost c(N ) generated by the coali-
tion of all players. It is a “fair” cost allocation in that it
satisfies four intuitive properties: efficiency, symmetry,
additivity and null-player; see [40, 46] for exact defini-
tions of these properties and more details. The Shap-
ley value of player i is precisely equal to i’s expected
marginal contribution if the players join the coalition
one at a time, in a uniformly random order. Formally
it is determined by:
φi(c) =
1
N !
∑
pi∈SN
(c(S(pi, i))− c(S(pi, i) \ i)) (2)
where the sum is taken across all permutations (or ar-
rival orders) pi of set N , and S(pi, i) is the set of play-
ers arrived in the system not later than i. In other
words, player i is responsible for its marginal contri-
bution c(S(pi, i)) − c(S(pi, i) \ i) averaged across all N !
arrival orders pi. Note that the Shapley value defined
by Eq. (2) indeed satisfies the efficiency property:∑
i∈N
φi(c) = c(N ).
4.2 Estimation of Shapley value in CIPT
While the Shapley value can be computed in a rather
straightforward manner using Eq. (2), it is not practi-
cally feasible to employ Eq. (2) for N > 30. A number
of methods have been suggested for accurate estima-
tion of Shapley value, and in this paper we use a simple
Monte Carlo method, analyzed in [30], as follows.
Instead of calculating the exact Shapley value as the
average cost contribution across all N ! arrival orders,
we estimate the Shapley value as the average cost con-
tribution over set Πk of K randomly sampled arrival
orders:
φˆi(c) =
1
K
∑
pi∈ΠK
(c(S(pi, i))− c(S(pi, i) \ i)) (3)
The parameter K determines the error between the
real Shapley value and its estimate: the greater K is
the lower the error becomes. Thus, basically, one can
control the accuracy of the estimator by increasing the
number of sample permutation orders. We observe in
our datasets of traffic demands that the value of K =
1000 provides expected error of under 1% across all the
CIPT players. Therefore, in the rest of the paper we use
K = 1000 for the computation of the Shapley value.
5. EVALUATION
In this section we quantify various factors that impact
CIPT by using traffic information from 264 (mainly na-
tional and regional) ISPs. In Section 5.1 we describe
the dataset and pricing model(s) used. In Section 5.2
we evaluate the potential savings of CIPT on country-
wide (IXP-wide) collaborations and show that signif-
icant savings could be expected both in relative and
absolute terms. We also calculate the breakdown of
the impact of the two complementary properties of IP
transit pricing, and conclude that while most of the sav-
ings can be expected from the subadditivity of prices, a
non-negligible share of the savings comes from the 95-th
percentile billing5. In Section 5.4 we augment this anal-
5For geo-diverse coalitions the share of savings coming from
IXP acronim # of members peak (Gbps) average (Gbps) 95th-pct effect (sum/max) skewness
Neutral IX (Prague) NIX 54 116 76 4.3%/29.1% 0.76
Slovak IX SIX 52 42 23 15.4%/44.9% 0.27
Israeli IX IIX 17 2.1 1.38 14.3%/40.6% 0
Finnish IX FICIX 25 32 19 6.7%/23.1% 0.48
InterLAN (Bucharest) InterLAN 63 22 11 14.3%/37.8% 0.12
Budapest IX BIX 53 152 92 3.6%/27.8% 0.84
Table 2: Basic stats on the used IXPs.
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Figure 3: The distribution of the peak traffic
rates across all 264 ISPs: median 560 Mbps; mean
2.9 Gbps.
ysis by empirically showing that even small single-digit
coalitions can yield close-to-optimal savings, by demon-
strating a law of diminishing returns for the savings as
a function of the coalition size. Section 5.3 analyzes
the per-partner savings and shows somewhat expectable
trends that the larger the partner is, the larger are its
absolute savings, but the smaller are its relative sav-
ings. In the technical report [43], we present additional
empirical results, including the analysis of the effects of
collaboration between geo-diverse partners and present
an analytical upper bound on the savings as a function
of the time difference in their peak-hour periods.
5.1 Dataset description
Although data for the traffic patterns of many ISPs is
often kept confidential, some public Internet eXchange
Points (IXPs) report upstream and downstream demand
time series for the traffic exchanged by every member
of the IXPs. Those that do it are listed in Table 2.
This traffic statistics data is typically given in the form
of mrtg images [7], similar to those shown in Figure 1.
Overall we collected the information for 264 ISPs, with
the traffic peak distribution as shown in Figure 3. Sec-
tion 5.1.2 considers a small set of ISPs that make their
detailed traffic information public, and presents an em-
piric argument showing that the IXP traffic of an ISP is
a good proxy for estimating its transit, at least for some
ISPs. Before that, we elaborate on the data collection
in the following Section 5.1.1.
5.1.1 Dataset collection
We started by manually inspecting the webpages of
the 95th-percentile billing is likely to be more pronounced.
the medium-sized and large IXPs [18]. A majority of
these IXPs publish their aggregate traffic statistics, sum-
med across all the members, but some, including those
listed in Table 2, also make public the detailed traffic
statistics of their members. We then crawled the web-
sites of these 6 IXPs and collected per-member traffic
information. This per-member traffic data is typically
given in the form of visual images, similar to those
in Figure 1, produced as the outputs of the standard
tools for traffic visualisation: mrtg/rrdtool [7]. To con-
vert the information into a numeric form, we built a
piece of software that takes as input an mrtg/rrdtool
image and outputs the numeric array representing the
upstream/downstream traffic time series. This oper-
ation of transforming the .png images to numeric data
required serious effort in the domain of optical character
and function recognition. Raw visual data, the numeric
data and the code for transforming mrtg/rrdtool images
into the numeric format can be found at [12].
5.1.2 From IXP data to IP transit traffic
Most ISPs consider the data of their networks as very
confidential and are reluctant to share it with third par-
ties. However, some ISPs share publicly large amounts
of operational information data. In particular, sev-
eral European ISPs serving academic institutions have
shared publicly on their websites a detailed picture of
both their network infrastructure and utilization of their
networks. Those that we identified are HEANET (Ire-
land) [23], SANET (Slovak Republic) [39], CESNET
(Czech Republic) [8], GRNET (Greece) [22]. We in-
spected the peering and transit traffic for those four
ISPs and found, somewhat expectably, that the peer-
ing traffic pattern is a good first-order indicator of the
transit traffic. In those 4 ISPs, peering corresponds to
35-40% of the total traffic, with the remaining 65-60%
being transit. Additionally, we observe that peering
and transit traffic follow very similar temporal patterns:
their growth and decay periods coincide, they peak in
the same time, have similar peak-to-valley ratios, etc.;
see the Appendix for more details. In some sense, such
behavior is not very surprising: given that the demand
is predominantly created by humans, both transit and
peering traffic demand are driven by the same end-user
activities.
Consequently in our analysis, we approximate the
transit traffic of ISPs (belonging to corresponding IXPs)
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Figure 4: The absolute/relative savings as a function of the transit to IXP traffic ratio.
with their peering traffic (information that is publicly
available) multiplied by a factor γ that determines the
relative weight of the transit vs. peering traffic. We
believe that, in spite of this relatively crude approxima-
tion, this first-order estimation provides a good starting
point for evaluation of CIPT and factors that affect it:
relative sizes of the players, temporal effects, peak-to-
valley ratio, etc. In Section 5.2 we describe expectable
savings of CIPT for a range γ ∈ [0.5, 4]. In Sections
5.3 and 5.4 (which analyze the cost-sharing and coali-
tion size), we fix γ = 1.5, that corresponds to transit
vs. peering traffic ratio of 60 : 40 as suggested by our
analysis in the Appendix, for medium-sized European
countries with a single dominant IXP (the case of our
6 IXPs).
5.1.3 Pricing model
In the following evaluation we use the Voxel pricing
model (described in Section 2) with prices given in Ta-
ble 1 and upstream/downstream traffic billed with ei-
ther sum or max model. In Section 5.2 we present the
results for both the sum and max models. In Sections
5.3 and 5.4 we focus on the sum pricing model (the
more conservative one in terms of cost reduction) for
the analysis of cost-sharing and coalition size.
5.2 Aggregate savings
In this section, we evaluate the aggregate potential
savings of the IP transit costs for the coalitions consist-
ing of all members of the IXPs listed in Table 2. Fol-
lowing the discussion in Section 5.1.2, we approximate
the IP transit traffic patterns with the traffic exchanged
at these IXPs multiplied by a constant γ ∈ [0.5, 4]; this
constant represents the ratio between the transit and
IXP traffic volume. As we discussed above, this ap-
proximation captures the main features of the ISP: rel-
ative size, peak-hour period, upstream-to-downstream
ratio, etc. For example, γ = 0.5 corresponds to the case
where the peering traffic amounts to 1/(1 + γ) = 2/3
of all the traffic of the ISP (as in Japan [9] and other
very localized markets), while γ = 4 corresponds to
the case where 1/(1 + γ) = 20% of the total ISP traf-
fic is exchanged at the IXP, and the remaining 80% is
transferred through transit (this situation is common in
small non-local IP markets [2]). The empirical evidence
of the few European ISPs discussed in the Appendix
suggests that, in medium-sized European countries with
one dominant IXP, γ is in the range between 1.5 and 2.
We stress again that the purpose of this evaluation
is to shed some light on the potential savings of CIPT
rather than computing accurate bounds of the savings.
Such exact saving estimates strongly depend on various
factors and should be calculated on a case-by-case basis.
For each of the 6 studied IXPs, Figure 4 reports the
expected savings on the IP transit bill, both relative and
absolute, in both sum and max models. We see that the
relative savings are in the range of 5-70% depending
on the relative size of the IXPs and several other fac-
tors. These relative savings are strongly impacted by
the size distribution of the involved ISPs. Namely for
those IXPs that have several large ISPs that dominate
the traffic (and the costs), the relative savings of CIPT
are low because these large ISPs already receive the low-
est price per Mbps. To illustrate that this is indeed the
case we define the skewness factor as the fraction of the
traffic generated by the players with peak traffic greater
than 10 Gbps. We see from Table 2 that for the IXPs
with a low skewness of under 0.3 (SIX, IIX, and Inter-
LAN), the expected relative savings are considerably
higher than those of the others with high skewness.
Remember that the savings of CIPT come from two
properties of the IP transit model: price subadditivity
and 95th-percentile billing. A crucial question in this
context is to quantify the effects that these two prop-
erties have on the CIPT savings. For this purpose we
identified what the relative savings would be without
the subadditivity of the prices, i.e., if the price perMbps
would be constant independent of the usage level. Such
savings would come exclusively from the reduction in
the 95th-percentile. Table 2 reports these results in the
column called 95th-pct effect. From this table we can
conclude that both properties (price subadditivity and
the 95th-percentile billing) influence the total savings
by a non-trivial amount. However, the exact break-
down of the impact of these two properties on the total
savings depends on the volume of the traffic and other
factors.
The decreasing trend of relative savings can be ob-
served in both sum and max pricing models. This is the
consequence of the fact that the players with large vol-
umes have smaller opportunities for large relative sav-
ings by CIPT (as they already experience a low per-
Mbps price). The relative savings are, however, bounded
from below by the 95th-pct effect quantity reported in
Table 2 for both sum and max models.
We conclude this analysis with an observation that
these 6 (medium-sized European) countries hosting these
IXPs have such traffic locality that around 40% of the
traffic stays inside the country and is exchanged by
peering (mainly through the dominant IXP) while the
remaining 60% of the traffic uses IP transit (see the
Appendix). Using the corresponding value γ ≈ 1.5, we
conclude that the expected relative savings in IP transit
costs for the IXP-wide CIPT coalitions are in the range
of 8-35% (in the sum model) and 32-56% (in the max
model).
5.3 Per-partner savings
In this section we look at the per-member savings
for each of the involved ISPs when it participates in
the IXP-wide CIPT. Following the reasoning described
in Section 5.1.2, the γ factor used for scaling of the
transit traffic is set to 1.5, and the pricing model is
the more conservative sum model. As we elaborate in
Section 4, each member of the coalition is assigned a
cost equal to its Shapley value. The CIPT costs (across
all ISPs) are depicted in Figure 5 against the original
IP transit annual costs. Figure 6 shows the absolute
annual savings (the difference between the original IP
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Figure 5: The original annual costs versus CIPT
costs (Shapley value) across all the ISPs from
the 6 IXPs.
transit costs and CIPT costs) for all ISPs in these 6
IXPs.
We can observe two trends in Figures 5 and 6. First,
the absolute savings typically grow with the size of the
ISP. This is a consequence of the fact that having a
large ISP in a coalition typically implies lower per-Mbps
prices, which in turn increases the contribution of the
ISP to the coalition and is reflected in the computation
of Shapley value, Eq. (2). In contrast to this increas-
ing trend of the absolute savings, the relative savings of
CIPT (the ratio of the absolute savings of CIPT to the
original IP transit costs) typically see a decreasing trend
as a function of the ISP size. This feature (decreasing
trend of the relative savings) is strongly connected with
the nature of Shapley value as a cost allocation strat-
egy and to the fact that the peak-hour of the coalition
is predominantly determined by large ISPs. This means
that large ISPs that join already large-enough coalitions
(those that reach a close-to-minimum price per Mbps)
do not bring great benefits to the coalition and con-
sequently implying low (yet positive) relative gains for
these ISPs.
5.4 Coalition size
In the previous section, we analyzed the potential
savings of coalitions that include all members of the
corresponding IXPs. While such coalitions offer signif-
icant savings in terms of IP transit costs, coordination
of such large coalitions may be cumbersome. Namely,
the managing costs of the coalition grow with the coali-
106 108 1010 1012
102
104
106
peak traffic (bps)
CI
PT
 s
av
in
gs
 (U
SD
)
 
 
nix
106 108 1010 1012
103
104
105
106
peak traffic (bps)
CI
PT
 s
av
in
gs
 (U
SD
)
 
 
six
106 108 1010
103
104
105
peak traffic (bps)
CI
PT
 s
av
in
gs
 (U
SD
)
 
 
iix
106 108 1010 1012
103
104
105
106
peak traffic (bps)
CI
PT
 s
av
in
gs
 (U
SD
)
 
 
ficix
106 108 1010 1012
103
104
105
peak traffic (bps)
CI
PT
 s
av
in
gs
 (U
SD
)
 
 
interlan
106 108 1010 1012
103
104
105
106
peak traffic (bps)
CI
PT
 s
av
in
gs
 (U
SD
)
 
 
bix
Figure 6: The absolute annual savings for all the
ISPs from the 6 IXPs.
tion size. Additionally, some ISPs may be unwilling to
participate in a common business arrangement or pre-
vented from the participation by their current contract
with the transit provider. See [43] for in depth discus-
sion on the CIPT organizational embodiment.
In this section, we show that small coalitions can offer
savings comparable to those of the large coalitions. For
that reason, we take the Slovak IXP (SIX) with N = 52
members, and for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} we analyze the
per-partner savings from participating in the coalition
of k random members of SIX. We use the sum pricing
model and γ = 1.5. The results for other IXPs, max
pricing model and other choices of γ are very similar,
hence we omit them for brevity.
In Figure 7 we report the median, 5th-percentile and
95th-percentile savings, relative to the savings obtain-
able from the grand coalition of all N = 52 members.
Since analyzing the statistics across all 252 subsets is
infeasible, we report the results obtained by sampling:
for each member i and each coalition size k, we pick
random 100 subsets of size k that contain member i.
From Figure 7 we can observe the law of diminishing
returns: relatively small coalitions provide savings very
close to the savings of the large coalitions, and, adding
more members to the coalition decreases the incremen-
tal savings. In particular, even with as few as k = 3
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Figure 7: Relative (as fraction of the savings
obtained in the grand coalition) per-partner sav-
ings for smaller coalitions.
members, one can expect savings that are half as large
as the savings obtainable by the coalition of all N = 52
members. With k ≥ 10 members, the median CIPT
savings are greater than 80% of the savings obtainable
with the grand coalition.
Note that the savings grow as the coalitions become
larger. This is the consequence of the basic property of
the CIPT cooperative game: the cost function is subad-
ditive, as seen in Ineq. (1). In other words, by adding
a member, the coalition is better off. Also, note that
for some ISPs, participating in some smaller coalitions
may be more beneficial than participating in the grand
coalition (the relative savings > 1).
We stress that the results of this section are for ran-
dom coalitions. By careful cherry-picking the most ap-
propriate partners, an ISP can obtain even higher sav-
ings, as the 95th-percentile of the savings in Figure 7
suggests. However, such optimization is out of scope for
the present paper.
6. CIPT BEYOND THE COST SHARING
Section 5.3 presented a compelling evidence that CIPT
with Shapley-value sharing of transit costs offers signif-
icant benefits to the CIPT partners. While the eco-
nomic incentives are crucial for CIPT being viable, the
viability is a topic with multiple dimensions. Without
pretending to be comprehensive, this section discusses
other aspects of CIPT such as its organizational embod-
iment, physical infrastructure, performance, traffic con-
fidentiality, interdomain routing and strategic issues.
Organizational embodiment: CIPT is an inno-
vative mechanism for reducing transit costs. Among
other cost-reduction mechanisms, peering is similar to
CIPT in its cooperative nature and commonly orga-
nized as a nonprofit IXP. In our vision for CIPT as an
organization, a typical arrangement is also a nonprofit
organization. The nonprofit status of a CIPT promotes
a valuable marketplace image of its neutrality and fair
treatment for all its partners. In such an organization,
partnership fees are used only to recover the technical
and management overhead costs of operating the CIPT
and expected to be insignificant in comparison to the
transit cost reductions provided by the CIPT. In a fu-
ture study, we plan to quantify the technical and eco-
nomic overhead. While the nonprofit arrangement looks
the most suitable, deviations are quite possible and even
likely; as with some existing IXPs, some CIPTs might
operate as government or commercial organizations. Fi-
nally, a single ISP may choose to participate in multiple
CIPTs in order to increase the provider diversity.
Physical infrastructure: The physical implemen-
tation is another issue where CIPTs can benefit from
the IXP experience. For buying IP transit in bulk, a
CIPT needs to concentrate traffic of multiple ISPs in
one location. The physical infrastructure of any IXP al-
ready supports such concentration for peering purposes.
Moreover, some IXPs diversify their service portfolio by
offering access to transit providers. For example, Van-
couver Transit Exchange is an IXP that also hosts tran-
sit providers and thereby enables an ISP to satisfy its
peering and transit needs at the same location [24]. A
CIPT can be implemented as a further diversification
of the IXP service portfolio. By leveraging the physical
infrastructure of an existing IXP, the CIPT can keep its
operational costs low.
Performance: A CIPT and its transit provider sign
a contract for IP transit. The contract is expected
to be of the same type as existing contracts between
an individual ISP and its transit provider. In par-
ticular, the contract includes an SLA (Service Level
Agreement) [45] stating the maximum outage duration,
packet delay, jitter, and loss rate for the CIPT traffic.
The SLA also specifies financial compensations by the
provider if the latter fails to provide the CIPT with
the agreed performance. In reality, SLA violations are
likely to be rare. Whereas the performance levels of
traditional inter-provider SLAs are very similar, hav-
ing a single SLA for the multiple-partner CIPT is not
problematic. Also, the typical SLA metrics of packet
delay, jitter, and loss rate are such that the traffic of
individual CIPT partners can inherit the performance
levels of the CIPT aggregate traffic without any special
technical support. Furthermore, the CIPT and its indi-
vidual partner can sign a separate bilateral agreement
on performance issues.
Traffic confidentiality: While it is feasible to for-
malize traffic metering and billing for a CIPT by means
of bilateral agreements between the CIPT and each of
its individual partners, the bill of a partner depends
on the traffic of the other partners. Some academic
ISPs – such as the aforementioned HEANET, SANET,
GRNET and CESNET – reveal their transit and peer-
ing traffic. However, a typical commercial ISP tends
to be more secretive and does not disclose its traffic
patterns. To alleviate the privacy concerns, a CIPT
can keep the traffic profiles of its partners confidential
and incorporate an internal audit system for verifying
the correctness of traffic metering and billing for each
partner. Note that the confidentiality undermines the
formation of most effective CIPTs. Making the traffic
profiles of ISPs and CIPTs public would help in deter-
mining the best matches between CIPTs and their po-
tential partners. In general, the overall efficiency of the
Internet industry would benefit from more transparent
traffic practices.
Interdomain routing: With BGP (Border Gate-
way Protocol) being a de facto standard protocol for
routing between ASes (Autonomous Systems), we see
no technical complications with CIPTs from the inter-
domain routing perspective. A CIPT can acquire a
separate AS number for inclusion into its BGP path
announcements. Alternatively, as in the case of some
IXPs, the partners of a CIPT can agree to use the indi-
vidual AS number of one (typically, prominent) partner
in all BGP announcements by the CIPT.
Transit providers and strategic issues: The costs
saved by CIPT coalitions are not necessarily the rev-
enues lost by transit providers due to at least two fac-
tors: aggregation of small traffic rates and competi-
tion among transit providers. Typically, a large ISP
is not interested in selling IP transit directly to small
ISPs. Instead, a middle-sized ISP resells the IP tran-
sit to the small customers. By forming a CIPT, the
small ISPs can make their aggregate traffic rate large
enough for the large provider and bypass the middle-
man. On the other hand, the large ISP finds in the
CIPT a new customer. As with IXPs in some countries,
transit providers can lobby their national governments
to outlaw CIPTs. However, as in the IXP cases, the
success of the legal actions is likely to be limited and
temporary. While a transit provider might be inclined
to offer a CIPT a contract with higher prices than in its
standard individual contract, this strategy is dangerous
for the provider because IP transit is a competitive mar-
ket: the CIPT can take its transit business to another
ISP, e.g., an ISP that offers only one type of transit con-
tracts. In general, we do not expect CIPT coalitions to
dominate the IP transit market or change the transit
pricing structure. However, if CIPT coalitions become
very common or large, this can lead to the common use
of CIPT-type contracts with higher prices. Our techni-
cal report [43] explores these and other strategic issues
in more detail.
7. RELATED WORK
In presenting and evaluating CIPT, we already men-
tioned the essential background information. This sec-
tion takes a broader look at related work.
The existing approaches for reducing the transit costs
include ISP peering, IP multicast, CDNs, P2P local-
ization, and traffic smoothing. Peering [4, 14] enables
two ISPs to exchange their traffic directly, rather than
through a transit provider at a higher cost. To dis-
seminate data to multiple receivers, IP multicast [13]
duplicates packets in IP routers and thereby reduces
transit traffic. While IP multicast requires router sup-
port from transit providers, CDNs [38] and P2P systems
duplicate data on the application level. Whereas a sin-
gle company controls a CDN, a P2P system consists of
independent hosts, and P2P localization [10] strives to
reduce transit traffic without undermining the system
performance. Even if the transit traffic preserves its
volume but is redistributed within the billing period to
peak at a lower value, the transit costs decrease due to
the burstable billing [16]. An ISP can do such traffic
smoothing with rate limiting [34] or in-network stor-
age for delay-tolerant traffic [28]. Unlike the above ap-
proaches that modify the transit traffic, CIPT reduces
the transit costs without altering it. Most recently, from
the transit provider perspective, [44] argues that having
a small number of different pricing tiers (different price
levels for varying bandwidth commit levels) is enough
for maximizing the IP transit provider profits.
We view CIPT as a coalition and use the Shapley
value [40] for sharing CIPT costs. Shair [25] is a co-
operative system for a different application of sharing
mobile phone minutes that enables phone users to share
the committed but unused minutes. Cooperative ap-
proaches have also been studied for cost sharing in IP
multicast [3, 19] and interdomain routing [33, 41]. The
game-theoretic analyses of the Shapley-value mecha-
nism [3, 19, 37] highlight its group-strategyproofness
and other salient properties but identify its high com-
putational complexity. Despite the computational com-
plexity, various proposals of traffic billing between ISPs
[31, 32], incentives in P2P systems [36], and charging
individual users by access ISPs [42] rely on the Shapley
value. Unlike the above applications of IP multicasting,
ISP billing, P2P incentives, and individual user charg-
ing which involve a large number of parties, CIPTs are
likely to be small in size. For CIPTs with few dozens of
partners, the exact computation of the Shapley value is
computationally feasible. Our evaluation of CIPTs uses
the Monte Carlo method to estimate the Shapley value
accurately [30].
8. CONCLUSIONS
In spite of the steady decline of IP transit prices, IP
transit costs remain high due to traffic growth. Over
the previous decades a number of solutions have been
suggested to reduce these IP transit costs, including
settlement-free or paid peering, IP multicast, CDNs,
and P2P localization.
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Figure 8: The transit and peering traffic in two
national ISPs: HEANET and SANET.
In this paper we propose an alternative cost-reduction
technique of Cooperative IP Transit (CIPT) that, in
contrast to the existing solutions, does not alter the
traffic. Instead, CIPT utilizes tuangou, or team-buying,
for IP transit. The savings in CIPT come from two dis-
tinct yet ubiquitous properties of the IP transit pric-
ing model: price subadditivity and burstable billing.
Our data-driven analysis suggests that significant sav-
ings can be expected from using CIPT. We are confident
that the potential savings of CIPT, combined with its
simplicity, would encourage many Internet entities to
engage in CIPT partnerships.
We conclude the paper with several open problems
that are the focus of our current investigation.
Open Problem 1. How do changes in CIPT affect its
dynamic?
Open Problem 2. Can we quantify the factors that
influence the CIPT coalition formation process?
Open Problem 3. Can we derive more suitable metrics
that would approximate the Shapley value closely, while
being explicit and simple to calculate?
Open Problem 4. What would be the effect of CIPT
on the Internet AS-level topology?
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APPENDIX: RELATIONSHIP OF TRANSIT
TO PEERING TRAFFIC
Here we discuss the relationship of the transit and peer-
ing traffic in two academic ISPs that publish their net-
work load information: HEANET and SANET. In Fig-
ure 8, we depict the peering and transit traffic for both
ISPs on Thursday, 13th Jan. 2011. One can observe
that the peering and transit traffic profiles are rather
similar. To quantify the similarity of the demand pat-
terns we use the cosine-similarity between the corre-
sponding demand time series: X = (x1, . . . , xT ) and
Y = (y1, . . . , yT ):
sim(X,Y ) =
∑T
i=1XiYi√∑T
i=1X
2
i
√∑T
i=1 Y
2
i
.
The value of sim(X,Y ) is equal to the cosine of the an-
gle between the vectors X and Y in the T -dimensional
euclidian space. Thus sim(X,Y ) = 1 if X = αY for a
scalar α; otherwise sim(X,Y ) < 1. Table 3 reports the
values of cosine-similarity for the upstream and down-
stream time series for the both ISPs.
Remark. We do not report the statistics from the
other two ISPs mentioned in Section 5.1.2, CESNET
[8] and GRNET [22], because their visual rrdtool im-
ages were very nonstandard and our OCR tool could
not extract numeric data from them. However, simple
visual check can confirm that the transit-peering rela-
tionships in these two networks are very similar to those
observed in HEANET and SANET.
